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COMMENT

Community Property after Hisquierdo
v. Hisquierdo
MARIE STEFANINI NEWMAN and PATRICIA SCHULTHEISS*

The division of property upon divorce in community property states1 has been affected by the
Supreme Court's decision in Hisquierdo u . HisquierdoY2which was handed down in January
1979. Hisquierdo held that a Railroad Retirement
Act pension, which under California community
property law was the property of both spouses,
divisible upon divorce, was the separate property
of the spouse who earned it. This pre-emption of
California community property law by the Railroad Retirement Act deprived the other spouse of
any interest whatsoever in the pension benefits.
Jess H. Hisquierdo filed a petition to dissolve his
marriage to Angela Hisquierdo in January 1975.3
At the time of the dissolution of marriage hearing
in 1975, Mr. Hisquierdo was fifty-five, and Mrs.
-

-

* Marie Stefanini Newman, Rutgers University School
of Law-Newark, Class of 1983. Pat:ricia Schultheiss, Rutgers University School of Law-Newark, Class of 1980; Staff
Attorney, Federal Trade Commission, Washington, D.C.
This Comment was begun while Ms. Schultheiss was a student.
1. Eight states have community property systems: Arizona, California, Idaho, Louisiana, Nevada, New Mexico,
Texas, Washington. See FAM.L. REP. (BNA) q1[ 403:i; 405:i;
413:i; 419:i; 429:0003; 432:0002; 444:i; 448:i.
2. 439 U.S. 572 (1979).
3. In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566
P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), reu'd, 439 U.S. 572
(1979). They had been married in 1.958 and separated in
1972. 19 Cal. 3d at 615, 566 P.2d at 225, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
591.

Hisquierdo was f i f t ~ - t h r e e Mr.
. ~ Hisquierdo had
been employed by the Atchison, Topeka & Santa
Fe Railroad from 1942 to 1975, and thereafter by
the Los Angeles Union Passenger Terminal.5 Both
jobs entitled him to retirement benefits under the
Railroad Retirement Act6 when and if he reached
age sixty.'
4. 19 Cal. 3d at 615, 566 P.2d at 225, 139 Cal. Rptr. at
591.
5. 439 U.S. at 578.
6. The Railroad Retirement Act of 1974, 45 U.S.C. §
231 (1976), set up a system of retirement and disability
benefits for employees of the railroad industry in lieu of
Social Security benefits. See 45 U.S.C. $ 231q. Both employees and carriers pay a federal tax which funds the Railroad
Retirement Account. 45 U.S.C. 231n. The Railroad Retirement Board, established by $ 231f of the Act, disburses
benefits from the Account to eligible individuals. 45 U.S.C.
$ 231a. The Railroad Retirement Act was first passed in
1934, and was struck down a year later in Railroad Retirement Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 U.S. 330 (1935). Congress
passed similar legislation in 1935, based on its power to tax
and spend for the general welfare. However, the Railroad
Retirement Board was enjoined from directing the railroad
companies to file reports or furnish the information the
Board would need to administer the 1935 Railroad Retirement Act in Alton R.R. Co. v. Railroad Retirement Bd., 16
F. Supp. 955 (D.D.C. 1936). Subsequent to this case, extensive negotiations resulted in passage of the Railroad Retirement Act of 1937. Amended many times, it remained in
force until superseded by the Railroad Retirement Act of
1974. For the history of the acts, see generally D. SCHREIBER,
THELEGISLATIVE
HISTORY
OF THE RAILROAD
RETIREMENT
AND
RAILROAD
UNEMPLOYMENT
INSURANCE
SYSTEMS
(1978) [hereinafter cited as SCHREIBER].
7. 439 U.S. at 578. See Railroad Retirement Act of
1974, 45 U.S.C. 231a (1976). The Court also pointed out
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The trial court's interlocutory judgment
awarded Mr. Hisquierdo the couple's house and
its furnishings, and awarded Mrs. Hisquierdo a
small interest in a mutual fund and an automobile. Mr. Hisquierdo was also ordered to reimburse his wife for her half of the equity in their
house, and a judicial lien in her favor was placed
on the real e ~ t a t eHowever,
.~
the court refused to
grant Mrs. ~ i s q u i e r d oan interest in her husband's
Railroad Retirement Act benefits, or an equivalent sum, on the ground that she had no community interest in those funds.Q
Writing for a unanimous California Supreme
Court, Justice Mosk reversed the trial courtlo and
held that Railroad Retirement Act benefits constitute community property, divisible upon divorce." Mr. Hisquierdo appealed to the Supreme
Court.12 Justice Blackmun, writing for a sevenperson majority, held that the Railroad Retirement Act pre-empted California community
property law.13
The result of the Hisquierdo decision is that a
non-employee spouse14is not entitled to a community property interest in a Railroad Retirement
Act pension fund partially or totally earned by an
that Angela Hisquierdo "had been gainfully employed for 35
years and had an expectation that upon her retirement she
would be entitled to benefits under the Social-Security Act."
439 U.S. at 579. Neither spouse claimed that Angela Hisquierdo's expectation of receiving those benefits was community property. Id. It is likely that the facts of this case did not
elicit the Court's sympathy. The Court recognized that the
"burden of marital dissolution may be particularly onerous
for a spouse who, unlike respondent, has no expectation of
receiving his or her own social security benefits." Id. at 590.
8. Id. at 579.
9. Id.
10. In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613, 566
P.2d 224, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590 (1977), rev'd, 439 U.S. 572
(1979).
11. Analyzing the California Supreme Court's opinion,
Justice Blackmun noted that the court had held that "because the benefits would flow in part from petitioner's employment during marriage, they were community property
even though under federal law petitioner had no enforceable
contract right." 439 U.S. at 580.
12. The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari,
435 U.S. 994 (1978), to consider whether the award of Railroad Retirement Act benefits conflicted impermissibly with
that Act under the standards laid out by the Court's Supremacy Clause cases. 439 U.S. at 581.
13. 439 U.S. at 590-91.
14. The term "non-employee spouse" is used throughout
this Comment to refer to a spouse who never worked for the
railroad industry, and thus has no direct interest in a Railroad Retirement Act pension. The term "employee spouse" is
used to designate a spouse who worked for the railroad
industry.
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employee spouse during the marriage. The decision will impact most severely on women, who,
generally, tend to earn less and work more erratically than men, and are unable to acquire as great
an interest in a pension fund as men who work.15
This Comment will briefly discuss California's
community property system, and the standards
traditionally required by the Supreme Court for
federal pre-emption of state property law. It will
also examine the Supreme Court's interpretation
of the Railroad Retirement Act which led the
Court to conclude that the Supremacy Clause of
the United States C o n s t i t u t i ~ n 'demanded
~
federal pre-emption in this case. It will discuss the
Hisquierdo test for federal pre-emption, which
the Supreme Court has since used to override state
community property systems. Finally, it will evaluate whether the case was correctly decided.

A.

California's Community Property System

The standards which California courts use
upon divorce to decide which assets are community property, and to divide that property between the spouses, are set forth in state statutes17
and the cases interpreting them.18

15. See TASK FORCEON SEX DISCRIMINATION,
CIVIL
RIGHTSDIVISION,U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,THE PENSION
PENSION
SYSTEM
FROM THE VIEWPOINT
GAME:THEAMVIERICAN
OF THE AVERAGE
WOMAN50-56 (1979).
16. U.S. CONST.art. VI, cl. 2.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE4 687 (West 1954), $4 4800-4812,
5100-5138 (West 1970). Section 687 defines community
property as "property acquired by husband and wife, or
either, during marriage, when not acquired as the separate
property of either." Section 4800 directs the court to divide
the community property and quasi-community property of
the parties equally. Quasi-community property is defined in
4 4803 as property acquired by either spouse which would
have been community property had the spouse who acquired
it been domiciled in California at the time. Separate property is defined in $9 5107 and 5108 as that "owned . . .
before marriage, and that acquired afterwards by gift, bequest, devise, or descent."
18. See, e . g . , Meyer v. Kinzer, 12 Cal. 247 (1859);
Nilson v. Sarment, 153 Cal. 524, 96 P. 315 (1908). In Meyer
v . Kinzer, the California Supreme Court explained California's community property statute:
[The California] statute proceeds upon the theory that
marriage, in respect to property acquired during its
existence, is a community of which each spouse is a
member, equally contributing by his or her industry to
its prosperity, and possessing an equal right to succeed
to the property after dissolution, in case of surviving
the other.
12 Cal. at 251.
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The fundamental premise underlying community property is that husband and wife are equal
partners in marriage. Each is deemed to make
equal contributions to the marital community,
and, therefore, shares equally in its assets.19 This
is true "irrespective of direct contributions to [the
acquisition of property] or the condition of title."zOHowever, property owned before marriage
or acquired separately after marriage by gift or
devise is not community p r ~ p e r t y . ~ '
Before considering Hisquierdo, the California
Supreme Court had occasion to determine the applicability of its community property statute to
the division of pension funds and retirement pay
upon divorce. In re Marriage of FithianZ2upheld
the trial court's characterization of that part of
the husband's federal military retirement pay
earned during the marriage as community prope r t ~ The
. ~ ~court noted that "the principle that
retirement benefits are community property has
been held to apply whether the source of the retirement fund lies in a state, federal, military or
private employment r e l a t i o n ~ h i p , " ~
and
~ that
treating military retirement pay as community
property does not frustrate the congressional military retirement scheme.25Military retirement pay
represents compensation for past services, and is
calculated solely on the basis of the number of
years served on active duty and the rank attained
prior to retirement; therefore, the court reasoned
that it is divisible as commurlity property to the
extent that the serviceperson was married while
on active duty.2e
In re Marriage of Brown2' dealt with the division upon divorce of non-vestedz8 pension rights
19. W. DEFUNIAK
& M. VAUGHN,
PRINCIPLES
OF COMMUPROPERTY
1-3 (2d ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as DEFuNIAK & VAUGHN].
20. Prager, The Persistence of Separate Property Concepts in Calijornia's Community Property System, 18491975, 24 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 1, 6 (1976).
21. DEFUNIAK
& VAUGHN,
supra note 19, at 153-57.
22. 10 Cal. 3d 592, 517 P.2d 449, 111 Cal. Rptr. 369
(1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 825 (1974), r e h g denied, 419
U.S. 1060 (1974).
23. Id. at 595, 517 P.2d at 450, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 370.
24. Id. at 596, 517 P.2d at 451, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 371.
25. Id. at 598-99, 517 P.2d at 453, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 37273.
26. Id. at 604, 517 P.2d at 456-57, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 37677.
27. 15 Cal. 3d 838, 544 P.2d 561, 126 Cal. Rptr. 633
(1976).
28. The California Supreme Court defined a vested pension in In re Marriage of Brown:
NITY
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earned by the husband during his employment
with General Telephone Company. Pension benefits are form of deferred compensation for services rendered; the employee's right to such benefits is derived from the employment contract.z9
Thus, the court held that an employee has a contractual right to pension benefits even if they are
not yet vested.30 Since a contractual right is not a
mere expectancy but a chose in action, a form of
property, an employee acquires a property right
to pension benefits when he or she begins to perform the employment contracta31The Brown decision reaffirmed the power of courts in community property states to divide the present value of
pension rights between the spouses, or, if the
value is too difficult to calculate because of the
uncertainties of vesting, to retain jurisdiction and
award each spouse an appropriate portion of each
pension payment as it is made-a method of distribution which subjects both spouses to an equal
risk that the pension will not vest.32

a

B.

Standards for Federal Pre-Emption in Family Law Cases Involving Property

The United States Supreme Court has generally
recognized that domestic relations should be governed by state, not federal, law.33 Only on rare
occasions, when a state family law conflicted
sharply with a federal statute, has the Supreme
Court declared the state law pre-empted. Federal
law pre-empts only if state law is found to do
"major damage" to "clear and substantial" federal
interests.34Even where pre-einption has occurred,
[A] pension right [is] vested if the employer cannot
unilaterally repudiate that iight without terminating
the employment relationship . . . . In divorce and dissolution cases . . ., however, the term 'vested' has acquired a special meaning; it refers to a pension right
which is not subject to a condition of forfeiture if the
employment relationship terminates before retirement
. . . [a pension] right which survives the discharge or
voluntary termination of the employee.
15 Cal. 3d at 842, 544 P.2d at 563, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 635.
29. I d . , 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637. Note,
however, that Brown concerned a pension derived from private employment and a private pension program. The pension in Hisquierdo derived from a pension fund created by
Congress. See infia text accompanying notes 89-91, discussing the non-contractual nature of the Railroad Retirement
Act and other public pension programs.
30. Id. at 845,544 P.2d at 565-66, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
31. Id. at 845, 544 P.2d at 565, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 637.
32. Id. at 848, 544 P.2d at 567, 126 Cal. Rptr. at 639.
33. See In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586, 593-94 (1890).
34. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
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the Court has limited review under the Supremacy Clause to a determination of whether Congress has "positively required by direct enactment" that state law be ~ r e - e m p t e d . ~ ~
Several United States Supreme Court cases
prior to Hisquierdo dealt with federal pre-emption of state family and family-property laws.36In
Wetmore v . M a ~ k o e the
, ~ ~Court held that the
United States Bankruptcy Act3s did not pre-empt
New York law under which alimony and child
support included in a divorce decree are not considered a debt, but rather a legal determination of
duty owing from husband to wife. As such, the
obligation to pay alimony and child support survives an adjudgment of b a n k r ~ p t c y . ~ ~
In McCune v . E~sig,~O
the federal homesteading
law41was held to pre-empt Washington's community property law.42In that case, McCune (the
husband) entered upon a homestead pursuant to
the terms of the
However, he died intestate

35. Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68, 77 (1904).
36. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341 (1966); Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v. Bland, 369
U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S. 655 (1950);
Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); McCune v. Essig, 199
U.S. 382 (1905); Wetmore v. Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
37. 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
38. Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, $ 63, 30 Stat. 544 (1898),
repealed by Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C. $5
101-411 (Supp. I11 1979).
39. 196 U.S. at 76. The Court went on to say:
The bankruptcy law should receive such an interpretation as will effectuate its beneficent purposes and not
make it an instrument to deprive dependent wives and
children of the support and maintenance due them
from the husband and father, which it has ever been
the purpose of the law to enforce.
Id. a t 77.
40. 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
41. The Homestead Act, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392 (1862), has
been amended many times. The current version is at 43
U.S.C. $5 161-302 (1976). Section 2291 (Homestead Act, ch.
127, $ 2, 14 Stat. 67 (.l866)) provides in pertinent part:
No certificate shall be given, or pstent issued therefor,
until the expiration of five years from the date of such
entry; and if, at the expiration of such time, or at any
time within two years thereafter, the person making
such entry, or, if he be dead, his widow; or in case of
her death, his heirs or devisee . . . prove[s] . . . that
he, she, or they have resided upon . . . the same
[land] he, she, or they, . . . shall be entitled to a patent, as in other cases provided by law.
Section 2292 (Homestead Act, ch. 127, $ 2, 14 Stat. 67
(1866)) provides in pertinent part: "[Iln case of the death of
both father and mother, leaving an infant child or children
under twenty-one years of age, the right and fee shall enure
to the benefit of such infant child or children."
42. 199 U.S. a t 390.
43. Id. at 386. See supra note 41.
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before a patent to the land was issued, and his
widow fulfilled the statutory requirements necessary to receive a patent to the land.44Years later,
after the land had been conveyed to Essig, McCune's daughter claimed that under Washington's
community property law, she was entitled to a
one-half interest in the property as her father's
heir under Washington's intestacy laws.45The Supreme Court rejected the daughter's argument;
since the statute was clear as to whom the patent
shall issue,46 Washington's community property
and intestacy laws were therefore deemed to be
~re-empted.~~
Washington's community property laws were
later upheld in Poe v . S e a b o ~ n which
, ~ ~ required
the Court to construe sections of the Revenue Act
of 1926.49The Act levied a tax upon the net income of every individual, but did not define what
constituted income.50 When Mr. and Mrs.
Seaborn each reported half of the total community income51 as gross income, the Internal Revenue Service determined that all of the income
should have been reported on Mr. Seaborn's return and consequently, that he owed additional
taxes.52 The Supreme Court held that local property law controlled and that the husband and wife
were entitled to file separate returns, each treating half of the community income as his or her
income.53 Local property law was deferred to,
even though, as the Court acknowledged, the

44. 199 U.S. at 386-87.
45. Id. at 387-88.
46. The Court said: "It requires an exercise of ingenuity
to establish uncertainty in these provisions . . . . The words
of the statute are clear, and express who in turn shall be
beneficiaries." Id. at 389.
47. Id.
48. 282 U.S. 101 (1930).
49. I.R.C. $0 951-952 (1926).
50. Section 953(a) defines net income as gross income, as
defined in $ 954(a), minus deductions allowed by $ 937 and
$955. According to the Court, the "Act goes no farther, and
furnishes no other standard or definition of what constitutes
an individual's income." 282 U.S. at 109.
51. The income comprised Mr. Seaborn's salary, along
with interest on bank deposits and on bonds. dividends, and
profits on sales of real and personal prope;ty. 282 U.S. at
109.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 118. The Court noted that the use of the word
"of" in the statute denoted ownership, but that no broader
significance should be given the phrase in the absence of
fuller definition by Congress. Id. at 109.
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result was lack of uniformity in the incidence of
taxation upon married people.54
In Wksner v . W i s ~ n e rthe
, ~ ~Court found that
California's community property law impinged
upon the National Service Life Insurance Act of
1940.5e The Act gave the insured the absolute
right to designate and change the beneficiaries of
the policy at
Here, the widow, who had
been estranged from her husband, the insured,
sued to recover one half of the proceeds of the
insurance policy, the beneficiaries of which were
the insured's parents. She claimed that the policy
was community property, and that she was therefore entitled to one half of the proceeds.5s The
Court decided that if it allowed the widow to
vindicate her state law claim, the soldier's choice
would be nullified, and Congress' intention frustrated.59Because Congress hacl "spoken with force
and clarity in directing that t.he proceeds belong
to the named beneficiary and no other,"e0 state
law had to be pre-empted.
Both Free v . Blande' and Yiatchos v . Yiatchose2
involved conflicts between state community property laws and federal regulations governing
United States Savings Bonds. In Free v . Bland,
the husband, using community funds, had purchased several bonds which were issued to "Mr. or
Mrs. Free."e3 Under Treasury Department regulations, when either co-owner dies, "the survivor
will be recognized as the sole and absolute
owner."e4 After Mrs. Free died, a controversy developed between her husband, who claimed that
the Treasury regulations gave him exclusive ownership of the bonds, and her son, who, as princi-

54. Id. a t 117-18. Implicit in the Court's holding was the
willingness to disrupt a comprehensive federal scheme in
order to uphold community property law.
55. 338 U.S. 655 (1950).
56. Id. a t 661.
57. National Service Life Insurance Act, 38 U.S.C. $
802(g) (1940) (current version at 38 U.S.C. $ 770(a) (1976)).
According to the Wissner Court, this section of the 1940 Act
was controlling. 338 U.S. a t 658. It provided that the "insured shall have the right to designate the beneficiary or
beneficiaries of the insurance, [within a designated class],
. . . and shall . . . a t all times have the right to change the
beneficiary or beneficiaries. . . . "
58. 338 U.S. a t 657-58.
59. Id. a t 659.
60. Id. at 658.
61. 369 U.S. 663 (1962).
62. 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
63. 369 U.S. a t 664.
64. 31 C.F.R. $ 315.61 (1959).
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pal beneficiary of his mother's will, claimed an
interest by virtue of Texas community property
laws.05 The Court said that Texas law had to yield
to federal regulations, because Texas law was in
conflict with the very purpose of the Treasury
regulations which establish an absolute right of
survivorship regardless of state law.ee
In Yiatchos v . Yiatchos, the husband purchased
United States Savings Bonds with community
funds which he made payable on his death to his
brother.e7 Relying on Treasury regulation^,^^ the
brother, after the husband's death, sought to establish his ownership of the bonds, while the
widow sought to vindicate her claim by asserting
property rights under Washington's community
property laws.e9The Washington Supreme Court
held that the husband's conduct in purchasing the
bonds was a fraud on his wife's rights and a
breach of his fiduciary duty to manage the community property for the benefit of the commun i t ~ . ~The
O United States Supreme Court held that
under the federal regulations Yiatchos' brother
was entitled to the bonds unless the widow could
show that the decedent had committed fraud or
breach of trust tantamount to f r a ~ d ; the
~ ' Court
noted that the widow could have consented to a
gift of community property to her brother-in-law
or to the inclusion of the bonds in that portion of
the estate which was her husband's property.72
While upholding the supremacy of the federal
regulations, the Court remanded the case to permit the widow an opportunity to prove the facts
concerning her knowledge of and participation in
the purchase of the bonds.73
United States v . Y a ~ e 1 1concerned
~~
a Small
Business Administration disaster loan made to a
Texas couple, who as security executed a chattel
mortgage on their store's merchandise and fix-

65. 369 U.S. at 665.
66. Id. a t 667-68. The Court declared: "State law which
prohibits a married couple from taking advantage of the
survivorship provisions of United States Savings Bonds
merely because the purchase price is paid out of community
property must fall under the Supremacy Clause." Id. a t 670.
67. 376 U.S. a t 307-08.
68. 31 C.F.R. $ 315.66 (1959).
69. 376 U.S. a t 308.
70. In re Yiatchos' Estate, 60 Wash. 2d 179, 182, 373
P.2d 125, 127 (1962), modified, 376 U.S. 306 (1964).
71. 376 U.S. at 309.
72. Id.
73. Id. a t 310.
74. 382 U.S. 341 (1966).
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tures. After default on the loan, the government
attempted to reach Mrs. Yazell's separate property. Mrs. Yazell moved for summary judgment
on the ground that under Texas coverture law,75
she lacked capacity to bind herself personally, unless she had first obtained a court decree removing
her disability to contract.7e Since she had not received such a decree, she argued that her separate
property should be unreachable. The Court
agreed, holding that in the absence of specific
federal legislation, the federal interest in collecting a debt did not override Texas law.77It stated:
Both theory and the precedents of this
Court teach us solicitude for state interests, particularly in the field of family
and family-property arrangements. They
should be overridden by the federal
courts only where clear and substantial
interests of the National Government,
which cannot be served consistently with
respect for such state interests, will suffer
major damage if the state law is applied.
Here, the Court found that repayment of SBA
loans did not present a federal interest sufficient
to pre-empt state law.7e
Thus, prior to Hisquierdo, pre-emption had
been required in only four cases since 1904.80In
McCune v . Essig and Wissner u . Wissner, the
Court found that the federal statutory schemes in
question were clearly intended to pre-empt any
state action, thus establishing a standard that
where federal law is comprehensive, state law
may not intervene. In Free v . Bland and Yiatchos
v . Yiatchos, the standard articulated was less rigorous. There, the Court defined the issue in terms
of a conflict between a federal statute and a state
law, and held that when such conflict occurs,
state law must yield.

75. At the time of the loan, Texas law provided that a
married woman could not bind her separate property unless
she had first obtained a court decree removing her disability
to contract. TEX.REV.CIV.STAT.ANN. art. 4626 (Vernon
1925).
76. 382 U.S. at 346-47.
77. Id. at 352.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 353.
80. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v.
Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S.
655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
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In two cases where state property laws were
upheld,a1the Court found the wording of the federal statutes to be unclear and ambiguous. United
States v . Yazell articulated a test for pre-emption:
where Congress has spoken with clarity and enacted specific provisions, and "major damage"
would be done to "clear and substantial" federal
interests, pre-emption must occur.82

The United States Supreme Court in Hisquierdo u . Hisquierdo reversed a California Supreme Court decision holding that federal Railroad Retirement Act benefits were subject to
community property distribution upon the dissolution of a marriage.83 The Court held that the
purpose of the Act, to assure employees that pensions would be available to them upon retirement,
together with the statutory scheme itself, mandated that California community property law be
pre-empted by the federal act under the authority
of the Supremacy Clause.84
While the Court recognized that marriage was
within the temporal control of the states,85 it relied upon its decisions in McCune v . Essig,
Wissner v . Wissner, Free v . Bland, and Yiatchos
v . Yiatchos to hold that state community property
law 'must be pre-empted because of the substantial damage which would otherwise be done.8e
The Court found Hisquierdo to be analogous to
those four cases because it too presented a conflict
between federal and state rules regarding allocation of a federal entitlement. The Court reasoned
that because compulsory federal taxes finance
railroad retirement benefits, the benefits closely
parallel the land homesteaded in McCune. In addition, the Court found that the provisions of the
Railroad Retirement Act protecting a beneficiary
against attachment and anticipation were similar
to the statutory scheme at issue in ' ~ i s s n e r . ~ ~
The Court described the Act as resembling both
a private pension plan and a social welfare plan
by creating two tiers of benefits: the upper tier of

81. Poe v. Seaborn, 282 U.S. 101 (1930); Wetmore v.
Markoe, 196 U.S. 68 (1904).
82. United States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352 (1966).
83. 439 U.S. 572, 590-91 (1979).
84. Id.
85. Id. at 581.
86. Id. at 581-83.
87. Id. at 582-83.
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benefits resembles a private pension plan because
of the correlation between benefits paid and an
employee's career service and earnings; the lower
tier of benefits corresponds exactly to those the
employee would expect to receive were he or she
covered by the Social Security
Furthermore, the Railroad Retirement Act provides for a
worker's spouse to receive individual benefits
which terminate if the spouse and the employee
are absolutely divorced.89 Also, the Court found
that Railroad Retirement Act benefits, unlike Social Security benefits, are not contractual in nature. Congress may alter or terminate them as it
sees fit.e0 This was so even though the Railroad
Retirement Act, unlike the Social Security Act,
does not explicitly reserve to Congress the right to
"alter, amend, or repeal any provision" of the
Act.91
Writing for the majority, Justice Blackmun
found that Congress, in enacting section 231m of
the Act, setting forth a flat prohibition against
attachment and a n t i c i p a t i ~ n ,meant
~~
to ensure
that Railroad Retirement Act benefits actually
reach the beneficiary. To the Court, section 231m
represents a clear choice by Congress to protect
the benefits from legal process. Under the standards articulated by the Court, such a congressional policy must pre-empt all state law with which
it conflict^.^^ Therefore, because Congress made

88. Id. at 574-75.
89. Id. at 575.
90. Id.
91. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 8 1304 (1976). The
Court found that this right was reserved to Congress because
the Railroad Retirement Act indirectly incorporated this language from the Social Security Act, and because the minimum benefit is the same as would have been received under
the Social Security Act. See 45 U.S.C. 8 231b(a)(l) (1976).
92. 439 U.S. at 576. The Railroad Retirement Act of
1974, 45 U.S.C. 8 231m (1976), provides:
Notwithstanding any other law of the United States,
or of any State, territory, or the District of Columbia,
no annuity or supplemental annuity shall be assignable
or be subject to any tax or to garnishment, attachment, or other legal process under any circumstances
whatsoever, nor shall the payment thereof be anticipated . . . .
The Court noted that this section was added in 1955 to make
"it clear that the railroad retirement and unemployment
benefits are still exempt from Federal or State taxation, garnishment and attachment, a clarification made necessary by
an inadvertent oversight in last year's new tax law and
doubts raised in several States." 101 CONG.REC. 11,772
(1955), cited at 439 U.S. 572, 584 n.17 (1979).
93. 439 U.S. at 584.
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no exception for a non-employee spouse with a
community property award, the non-employee
spouse was not permitted to reach the benefits to
vindicate such an award.94In fact, the Court reasoned that the creation of a separate annuity for
non-employee spouses which terminates upon absolute divorcee5 indicated congressional intent
that the employee's retirement benefits would belong solely to the employee.ee Therefore, it held
that a non-employee spouse is not entitled to any
portion of an employee spouse's annuity.
The Court also looked to the legislative history
of the Act to glean congressional intentae7During
revision of the Railroad Retirement Act in 1974, it
was proposed that a divorced spouse receive a

94. Id. at 585.
95. 45 U.S.C. 8 231d(c)(3) (1976).
96. 439 U.S. at 584.
97. The Act entitles railroad industry employees to an
annuity if they meet the criteria specified in 8 231a:
(a)(l) The following-described individuals, if they
shall have c o m ~ l e t e dten vears of service and shall
have filed application for annuities, shall, subject to
the conditions set forth in subsections (e), (f), and (h)
of this section, be entitled to annuities in the amounts
provided under section 231b of this title(i) individuals who have attained the age of sixtyfive;
(ii) individuals who have attained the age of sixty
and have completed thirty years of service;
(iii) individuals who have attained the age of sixtytwo and have completed less than thirty years of service, but the annuity of such individuals shall be reduced by 11180 for each calendar month that he or she
is under age sixty-five when the annuity begins to
accrue;
(iv) individuals who have a current connection with
the railroad industry, whose permanent physical or
mental condition is such as to be disabling for work in
their regular occupation, and who (A) have completed
twenty years of service or (B) have attained the age of
sixty; and
(v) individuals whose permanent physical or mental
condition is such that they are unable to engage in any
regular employment.
Its sponsors felt that the Act would encourage older workers
to retire by providing them with the means "to enjoy the
closing days of their lives with peace of mind and physical
comfort," and so would "assure more rapid advancement in
the service" and also more jobs for younger workers. H.R.
REP. NO. 1711, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10 (1935), cited at 439
U.S. at 573-74. Lee M . Eddy, Vice President, Order of
Railroad Telegraphers, testified in favor of the original bill.
He was concerned about certain defects in the railroads'
supra note 6, at 4.
private pension plans. See SCHREIBER,
Eddy felt that the Act would provide railroad employees
with the assurance that when they reached retirement age, a
fund would exist from which their annuities would be paid
which was not subject to discontinuance through the unilateral action of the employer. SCHREIBER,
supra note 6, at 4-5.
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separate benefit similar to that received by a divorced spouse under the Social Security Act.98
This proposal was rejected by the labor-management negotiation committee and later by Congress, because of the precarious financial condition of the Railroad Retirement A c c o ~ n t The
.~~
Court interpreted this as a careful and deliberate
decision by Congress to award the annuity to the
employee spouse alone.'OO Furthermore, Congress's objective of encouraging older employees
to retire would be frustrated by automatic reductions in the amount of the annuity the employee
spouse receive^.'^' Thus the Court rejected Angela
Hisquierdo's contentions that Congress could not
have intended the harsh result which left her
without compensation for her contributions to the
marital community, and that section 231m
merely "restate[s] the Government's sovereign immunity from burdensome garnishment suits."102
In support of its holding that a non-employee
spouse cannot reach an employee spouse's benefits
for a community property settlement, the Court
relied heavily on the fact that Congress had recently codified a distinction between alimony and
support awards on the one hand, and community
property awards on the other, in amendments to
the Social Security Act. The Court found that
these amendments expressly override section
231m and allow garnishment for alimony, spousal
support and child support claims; they also provide that for the purposes of the amendments,
"alimony" does not include community property
settlements.lo3The Court determined that at least

98. 439 U.S. at 585. See Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C.
$4 402(b), 416(a) (1976 & Supp. IV 1980).
99. 439 U.S. at 585 & n.18.
100. Id. at 585.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 585-86.
103. 42 U.S.C. $ 6 5 9 (1976) and 42 U.S.C. 4 662 (Supp. I
1977). Section 659 provides:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, effective January 1, 1975, moneys (the entitlement to
which is based upon remuneration for employment)
due from, or payable by, the United States . . . to an
individual, including members of the armed services,
shall be subject, in like manner and to the same extent
as if the United States were a private person, to legal
process brought for the enforcement, against such individual of his legal obligations to provide child support or make alimony payments.
After passage of $ 659, confusion arose in the lower courts as
to whether community property was included within the
definition of "alimony." As a result, in 1977 Congress added
a definitional amendment, $ 662, which stipulated that for
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part of the reason for enacting the amendments
was to save the Government money through reductions in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) payments brought about by the
ability of neglected spouses and children to garnish money directly from the Government.lo4The
Court went on to state that it was "therefore logical to conclude that Congress, in adopting [section 662(c)], thought that a family's need for support could justify garnishment, even though it
deflected other federal benefit programs from
their intended goals, but that community property claims, which are not based on need, could
not do so." lo5
The Court rejected Angela Hisquierdo's contention that she could leave the benefit scheme intact
by receiving an offsetting award taken out of
other currently available community assets.'0e
The Court determined that this remedy suffered
from the same infirmities as did attachment.lo7In
purposes of $ 659, "alimony" did not include community
property settlements. 439 U.S. at 587, n.20. Section 662(c)
provides:
The term 'alimony', when used in reference to the
legal obligations of an individual to provide the same,
means periodic payments of funds for the support and
maintenance of the spouse (or former spouse) of such
individual, and (subject to and in accordance with
State law) includes but is not limited to, separate
maintenance, alimony pendente lite, maintenance,
and spousal support; such term also includes attorney's
fees, interest, and court costs when and to the extent
that the same are expressly made recoverable as such
pursuant to a decree, order, or judgment issued in
accordance with applicable State law by a court of
competent jurisdiction. Such term does not include
any payment or transfer of property or its value by an
individual to his spouse or former spouse in compliance with any community property settlement, equitable distribution of property, or other division of property between spouses or former spouses.
See itlfra text accompanying notes 170-74.
104. 123 CONG.REC. 9,015 (1977). Senator Nunn introduced and explained the 1977 amendments. In doing so, he
discussed the savings to the federal government over the
preceding two years which he expected to continue due to
garnishment.
105. 439 U.S. at 587. See also infra notes 175-76 and
accompanying text.
106. 439 U.S. at 588. Angela Hisquierdo sought a remedial offset under the authority of In re Milhan, 13 Cal. 3d
129, 528 P.2d 1145, 117 Cal. Rptr. 809 (1974), cert. d e n . ,
421 U.S. 976 (1975). This case which applied California
community property law to military retirement benefits was
reopened and reversed after Hisquierdo. Rev'd, 97 Cal. App.
3d 41, 158 Cal. Rptr. 523 (1979).
107. 439 U.S. at 588. That is, the Court felt that the
statutory scheme would be upset and the employee spouse's
economic security jeopardized, as it would be from a regular, periodic deduction from the benefits themselves.
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addition, the section 231m prohibition against anticipation prevented Mrs. Hisquierdo from seeking an offsetting award. lo8 The Court stated three
reasons why an offsetting award would frustrate
the anti-anticipation provision. First, it would allow Mrs. Hisquierdo to receive her interest in
advance of the date Congress had set for interest
to accrue.log Second, the uncertainties surrounding the payment of benefits and the amount
thereof could make a lump sum award unfair."O
Third, because Congress has the right to alter the
terms of the Act, any lump sun1 offset would frustrate congressional ability to do so without unduly
penalizing future recipients of the benefits."'
In his dissent, Justice Stewart, joined by Justice
Rehnquist,l12 attacked the majority's opinion. He
found "nothing in the Act to suggest that Congress
meant to insulate these pension benefits from the
rules of ownership that in California are a normal
incident of marriage."l13 Noting that Congress ordinarily acts "against the background of the total

108. Id. Provisions which create a restraint on anticipation usually arise within the context of spendthrift trusts. A
spendthrift trust is created to provide a fund for the maintenance of the beneficiary, and at the same time to secure it
against his or her improvidence or incapacity. BLACK'SLAW
DICTIONARY
1256 (5th ed. 1979). A leading commentator on
spendthrift trusts has defined the restraint on anticipation as
an instruction that the "interest of a sc~lebeneficiary shall not
SPENDbe paid to him before a certain date." E. GRISWOLD,
THRIFT TRUSTS$ 512 (2d ed. 1947) [hereinafter cited as
CHISWOLD].
109. 439 U.S. at 589. The Court noted that in Hetrick v.
Reading Co., 39 F. Supp. 22 (D.N.J. 1941), "the prohibition
against anticipation was applied in this sense. The court held
that a defendant employer could not offset a tort claim by
the amount the plaintiff expected to receive in Railroad
Retirement Act disability benefits." Id. at 588 n.22. But see
infra notes 166-69 and accompanying text.
110. 439 U.S. at 589. The Court stated that the unfairness
could arise in a number of ways. If the employee spouse died
before collecting any benefits, his or her beneficiary could
suffer if the lump sum award of cominunity property to the
non-employee spouse exceeded the lump sum death benefits
provided for in $ 231e of the Act. Also, if the employee left
the railroad industry before retirement, he or she might lose
certain supplemental benefits provided for in 5 231a(b)(iv).
Another possibility is that Congress could alter the terms of
the Act to the detriment of the emplc~yeespouse. Id.
111. Id. at 589-90.
112. At the time Hisquierdo was decided, Justice Rehnquist was the only member of the Supreme Court who had
practiced law in a community property state (California and
Arizona). It is logical to infer, therefore, that he was more
familiar than were his colleagues with the law as it relates to
community property.
113. Id. at 591 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
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corpus juris of the states,"l14 the dissent emphasized the importance of an accurate understanding of the state substantive law in the area where
pre-emption is ~ l a i m e d . "He
~ dismissed the majority's suggestion that a community property settlement was a benefit for a divorced spouse.lle
Justice Stewart pointed out that a "community
property settlement merely distributes to the
spouses [sic] property which . . . he or she already
owns,"l17 and that the California Supreme Court
had decided to treat pension benefits as property
even though such benefits were not formally
vested.'18
Justice Stewart emphasized the high standards
necessary for federal pre-emption in the area of
family property law,"9 and distinguished those
cases relied upon by the majoritylZ0which held
that federal law pre-empted the state community
property law in question.12' He asserted that the
finding of pre-emption in Wissner and Bland was
based on "explicit provisions of federal law
[which] not only conflicted with principles of
state law but also created property rights at variance with the rights that normally would have
been created by local property law."122The Railroad Retirement Act, he pointed out, contained
no express provisions governing the ownership
rights that might attach to the pension interest of
a married employee.lZ3
Justice Stewart attacked the Court's conclusion
that Congress intended to pre-empt state community property law by titling the benefit in the

114. Id., citing Wallis v. Pan Am. Petroleum Corp., 384
U.S. 63, 68 (1966), which cited H. HART& H. WECHSLER,
THEFEDERAL
COURTS
A N D THE FEDERAL
SYSTD~VI
435 (1953).
115. Id. at 592, citing Perez v. Campbell, 402 U.S. 637,
644 (1971); Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc. v.
Ware, 414 U.S. 117 (1973). In Merrill Lynch, the Court
discussed the standards for federal pre-emption: "Our analysis is also to be tempered by the conviction that the proper
approach is to reconcile 'the operation of both statutory
schemes with one another rather than holding one completely ousted.' " 414 U.S. at 127; see also Silver v. New York
Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963).
116. 439 U.S. at 592 (Stewart, J . , dissenting). See supra
text accompanying notes 19-21.
117.' 439 U.S. at 593.
118. Id. at 594.
119. Id. at 594-95. See supra text accompanying notes 3335.
120. Id. at 595-96. See cases cited supra note 80.
121. 439 U.S. at 595-96.
122. Id. at 596.
123. Id. at 597.
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employee spouse and providing a separate annuity
for the non-employee spouse.lZ4He conceded that
the anti-attachment provision, section 231m, was
the only provision of the Act which might arguably conflict with California community property
law.lZ5But, Justice Stewart reasoned, such provisions are generally designed to prevent creditors
from reaching the benefits; under community
property law, spouses are co-owners, not creditors
of each other.lZe Upon dissolution of the marriage, "the community property is divided, not
adjudicated as indebtedness."lZ7Furthermore, he
considered the prohibition against garnishment
and attachment inapplicable here because those
"terms govern remedies, not ownership rights,
and the remedies themselves traditionally have
been unavailable in an action grounded upon the
theory that the property at issue 'belongs' to the
claimant."128 Justice Stewart also noted that because the Hisquierdos lived in a community property state, the pension as property belonged to
both spouses. Because division of the property between co-owners should not be interpreted as an
"assignment," the section 231m prohibition
against assignment should be inapplicable in community property states.12@
Justice Stewart found the majority's reliance on
the prohibition against anticipation as unpersuasive as its other arguments.130 At common law,
Justice Stewart explained, the restraint against
anticipation was used to prevent creditors from

124. Id. at 597-98.
125. Id. at 598.
126. Id. at 599. The question of whether a former spouse
is a creditor has also been considered in the context of
ERISA. Virtually every court which has considered the issue
has held that under ERISA a former spouse is not a creditor
and may levy against the spouse's pension to enforce a support obligation. See Operating Engineers Local 488 Pension
Fund v. Zamborsky, 650 F.2d 196 (9th Cir. 1981), which
cites cases from several jurisdictions in support. The rationale for these decisions is protection of dependents and the
state's interest in enforcins support agreements. ERISA's
anti-assignment and alienation provisions were included
only "to protect a person and those dependent on him from
the claims of creditors, not to insulate a breadwinner from
the valid support claims of spouse and offspring." Mallory v.
Mallory, 179 N.J. Super. 556, 559 (Ch. Div. 1981) '(citing
Cartledge v. Miller, 457 F. Supp. 1146 (S.D.N.Y. 1978)).
127. 439 U.S. at 599.
128. Id. See generally J . ROOD,A TREATISE
ON THE LAW
OF GARNISHMENT
(1896); S. KNEELAND,
LAWOF ATTACHMENTS (1885).
129. 439 U.S. at 599-600.
130. Id. at 600.
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compelling the trustees of a fund to make lump
sum payments before they came due.131 He disagreed with the Court's conclusion that by considering the pension fund in making a community
property settlement, a judge was anticipating the
payment of the benefits.132Justice Stewart also
attacked the majority's suggestion that the prohibition against anticipation "was designed to preserve congressional 'freedom to amend the
Act.'
He was not persuaded by the majority's
reasoning that Congress was free to amend the
Railroad Retirement Act because it contained no
explicit provision which reserved this power to
C 0 n g r e ~ s . lJustice
~~
Stewart concluded that the
legislative history, in fact, suggested that the opposite was true.135

IV. EVALUATION
Confronted with an ambiguous statute, and notions of federalism which require that "major
damage" be done to "clear and substantial" federal interests before the Supremacy Clause requires that state community property law be overridden,130 the Hisquierdo Court should have
decided the case on the basis of California community property law.
The four cases137relied on as precedent for federal pre-emption of state community property
law 138 are distinguishable from Hisquierdo . In
each case, the relevant statute created either clear
and explicit conflicts with the state community
property law in question, or impinged upon a
comprehensive federal scheme.139But the statutory provisions in Hisquierdo were not clearly in

131. Id. at 601. See also GRISWOLD,
supra note 108.
132. 439 U.S. at 601.
133. Id. at 602.
134. Id.
135. Id. Justice Stewart pointed out that the legislative
history suggests that the Act was passed to provide security
for railroad industry employees whose benefits under private
pension plans had often been considered discretionary. The
Act's drafters wanted to guarantee workers an absolute right
to their pensions. Therefore, the anti-attachment provision
did not relate to Congress' possible termination or reduction
of Railroad Retirement Act pensions. H.R. REP. NO. 1711,
74th Cong., 1st Sess. 10-11 (1935).
136. 439 U.S. at 581. U.S. v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 352
(1966).
137. Yiatchos v. Yiatchos, 376 U.S. 306 (1964); Free v.
Bland, 369 U.S. 663 (1962); Wissner v. Wissner, 338 U.S.
655 (1950); McCune v. Essig, 199 U.S. 382 (1905).
138. See 439 U.S. at 582-83.
139. See supra text accompanying notes 40-47, 55-73.
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conflict with state property law; nor was the benefits scheme so comprehensive as to override local
law. Thus, pre-emption should not have occurred. As Justice Stewart said, "In the Railroad
Retirement Act of 1974 Congress did not with
'force and clarity' direct that the employee's pension benefits should not be subject to the substantive community property law of C a l i f ~ r n i a . " ' ~ ~
In Hisquierdo, the Court relied on certain aspects of the Railroad Retirement Act141to support
its holding that it was in clear conflict with state
community property law arid therefore preempted the state law.142Initially, the Court examined the legislative history and purposes of the
It concluded that the Act was intended to
implement the federal policy of providing greater
economic security to retiring railroad industry
employees, thereby encouraging older workers to
retire.144But this articulation of federal policy by
the Court merely restated the obvious: that pensions are intended to provide a retirement income
to employees. 145 This policy is not so compelling as
to justify pre-empting state substantive domestic
property law.
The Court also determined that Railroad Retirement Act benefits were not contractual inasmuch as Congress had reserved the power to alter
or terminate them at any time.'47This reservation
of power by Congress is not express, however;
rather, it was inferred by analogy from the Social
Security Act, where an express reservation of
power appears.148 The Court's presumptions
about and interpretation of the contractual nature
of Railroad Retirement Act benefits seem illogilogica1 assume that because Concal. It is
-gress made an explicit statement in the Social Security ACt,14g it-WOUldhave made a similarly
explicit statement in the Railroad Retirement Act
had it intended to reserve the Power to amend or
repeal at will. 150

140. 439 U.S. at 597.
141. See supra text accompanying notes 84-1 11.
142. 439 U.S. at 590.
143. Id. at 584-85. See supra notes 97-1 11 and accompanying text.
144. 439 U.S. at 584-85.
145. Id. at 590.
146. Id. See supra text accompanying notes 33-81.
147. 439 U.S. at 575 n.6.
148. Id. See also supra text accompanying notes 90-91.
149. Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. $ 1304 (1976).
150. This interpretation of the two acts is consistent with
the maxim of statutory construction: "Expressio unius est
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The Court's conclusion that the benefits are not
contractual is also inconsistent with the legislative
history and purposes of the Act as interpreted by
the majority itself.151The purposes of the Act indicate that a beneficiary of this federal pension plan
acquires at least some contractual right to the
benefits. Retention of the power to terminate is
contrary to Congress' concern for railroad employees' financial security and peace of mind.152
However, even if the benefits are, in fact, noncontractual, California would still be free to treat
the employee spouse's interest therein as community property.Is3 AS the dissent notes, if a state is
free to treat even a non-vested expectancy interest
as property,154then that characterization should
stand unless the state property law conflicts in
other ways with federal policies and laws.
The Court's finding that section 231d(c)(3) of
the Railroad Retirement Act, creating a separate
annuity for non-employee spouses, indicated a
congressional intent to designate the Act's retirement benefits to the employee spouse alone, is also
questionable.'55 The Court concluded that to allow the non-employee spouse to appropriate a
portion of the employee spouse's benefits would
deprive the employee of a congressional entitlement to benefits.156The Court thus imputed a
meaning to section 231d(c)(3) which is stated nowhere in the Act itself. This interpretation results
from a strained reading of a section of the Act
which has nothing to do with the property rights
of divorcing spouses in the pension fund.157

exclusio alterius." Mention of one thing implies exclusion of
another. If something is expressed in one statute and not in
another, the exclusion in the seiond is deliberate.
151. See supra notes 97-101 and accompanying text.
152. See 439 U.S. at 602 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Justice
Stewart pointed out that legislative history suggests that the
ailr road-~etirement Act was intended to provide security to
workers whose pension benefits under private plans were
often at the em<loyer's discretion.
153. Id. at 591. See Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117 (1945)
(affirming the principle that the Supreme Court will not
review judgments of state courts which rest on adequate and
independent grounds). Justice Stewart noted that since California courts routinely deal with problems in assessing the
value of community property, difficulties in assessment cannot provide a basis for federal pre-emption. 439 U.S. at 603
(Stewart, J., dissenting). The same observation applies to
courts in any community property state.
154. See supra text accompanying note 31.
155. 439 U.S. at 584-85.
156. Id.
157. The plain language of $ 231d(c)(3) does not support
the Court's interpretation: "The entitlement of a spouse of
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Congress' decision not to award a divorced
spouse a separate annuity was interpreted by the
Court as a deliberate decision to award the retirement annuity to the employee spouse alone.lS8
The Court, however, contradicted itself in an attempt to justify this conclusion. The Court first
stated that the Railroad Retirement Act embodied
a community concept by providing a separate
benefit for a spouse.159But in the same paragraph, the Court stated that the decision not to
provide a benefit to a divorced spouse was a deliberate rejection of community property principles.leOThis conclusion was undermined by the
Court's own recognition of the precarious financial condition of the Railroad Retirement Account.lel Thus, the Court itself acknowledged
that the divorced non-employee spouse is deprived
of benefits not because Congress rejected the community concept, but because Congress determined that there were not sufficient funds available to continue such,benefits. In fact, it is logical
to suppose that Congress terminated the separate
award upon absolute divorce because it assumed
that the non-employee spouse could vindicate his
or her claim through community property law.le2
The Court relied heavily upon the language of
section 231m which protects the benefits from
legal process "notwithstanding any other law . . .
of any State" to argue that such benefits are protected from state community property law. le3 The
Court buttressed this argument by asserting that
"[elven state tax-collection laws must bow to its
command."le4 It is clear, however, that Congress
added the clause to ensure that neither federal nor
state tax collectors would be able to encroach on
the distribution of benefits, not to prevent
spouses, who are co-owners in community property states, from vindicating their ownership
rights. le5
an individual to an annuity under section 231a(c) of this title
shall end on the last day of the month preceding the month
in which (A) the spouse or the individual dies, (B) the spouse
and the individual are absolutely divorced. . . ."
158. 439 U.S. at 584-85.
159. Id. at 584.
160. Id.
161. Id. at 585.
162. See In re Marriage of Hisquierdo, 19 Cal. 3d 613,
618, 566 P.2d 224, 227, 139 Cal. Rptr. 590, 593 (1977),
reu'd, 439 U.S. 572 (1979). See 439 U.S. at 586, where the
Court disposes of such a claim by Angela Hisquierdo.
163. 439 U.S. at 585.
164. Id. at 584.
165. Id. See supra note 92.
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The Court also asserted that a non-employee
spouse could not be the co-owner of an interest
which the employee spouse does not yet own.lee
But our federalist system gives the states the right
to create substantive property rights even in mere
expectancies.le7 The Court ignored this state
right.
Section 231m was intended to protect benefits
from creditors, and should not be used to prevent
a co-owner from vindicating his or her ownership
rights. A non-employee spouse is not a creditor of
the employee spouse; nor does he or she receive a
"benefit" by acquiring an interest in a pension
fund through a community property settlement.le8 The non-employee spouse merely receives that proportion of the benefits attributable
to his or her contributions to the marital community.le9
The Court stressed the fact that Congress had
codified a distinction between alimony and support awards on the one hand, and community
property awards on the other, when it passed
certain amendments to the Social Security Act.170
Those amendments permitted garnishment of federal benefits for alimony, spousal and child support claims, but explicitly defined alimony so as to
exclude community property settlement^.'^' An
examination of several lower court cases172indicates that the amendments were a response to
disagreement over whether the United States
Government was amenable to legal process and
garnishment proceedings for community property
~ett1ements.l'~
The cases did not question the right

166. 439 U.S. at 589-90.
167. Id. at 591 (Stewart, J., dissenting). See supra text
accompanying note 153.
168. 439 U.S. at 593-94 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
169. Id. at 593. See supra text accompanying notes 19-21.
170. 439 U.S. at 587. See 42 U.S.C. 5s 659, 662(c) (Supp.
I V 1980).
171. 42 U.S.C. $5 659, 662(c) (Supp. IV 1980). See 439
U.S. at 576-77.
172. Marin v. Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1977);
Kelley v. Kelley, 425 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. La. 1977); Williams v. Williams, 338 So.2d 869 (Fla. App. 1976); United
States v. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ. App. 1977),
reu'd, 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1978).
173. United States u. Stelter, 553 S.W.2d 227 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977), reu'd, 567 S.W.2d 797 (Tex. 1978) involved an
ex-wife who instituted garnishment proceedings against the
United States to recover a portion of her former husband's
military retirement pay awarded her in a divorce decree.
The Texas Court of Civil Appeals held that Dorothy Stelter
could garnish the United States. On appeal, the Texas Supreme Court reversed on the ground that the United States
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of the non-employee spouse to sue the employee
spouse for a portion of the benefits pursuant to a
community property award, and no explicit
showing of an intent to prohibit such suits was
made. Thus, the conclusion that Congress intended by these amendments to cut off the right of
a non-employee spouse to pension benefits for a
community property settlement is attenuated at
best, particularly without a more explicit showing
of intent. 174
A more logical interpretation of sections 659
and 662(c) is that they concern only the United
States Government's amenability to legal process
for garnishment of moneys payable by it to the

had not consented to be sued in a garnishment proceeding to
vindicate community property claims. Note that Texas does
.
ANN.Q 3.59
not allow permanent alimony. TEX.I ~ A MCODE
(Vernon Supp. 1982). In Williams v. Williams, 338 So.2d
869 (Fla. App. 1976), a divorced husband complained of an
order for writ of garnishment subjecting his United States
retirement benefits to a payment tc~his former wife. The
court held that liquidated arrearages due Katharina Williams under a Texas divorce decree csould be considered alimony for purposes of Q 659, and so were amenable to garnishment. Marin v . Hatfield, 546 F.2d 1230 (5th Cir. 1977),
arose when an ex-husband refused to pay his former wife
that portion of his military retirement: benefits granted her in
a Texas divorce decree; the former wife sought to garnish the
United States. The court acknowledged that the United
States has by statute waived immunity for enforcement of
alimony obligations, but denied the wife alimony on other
grounds. Military retirement benefits were also at stake in
Kelley v . Kelley, 425 F. Supp. 181 (W.D. La. 1977), in
which a former wife sued her ex-husband and the United
States. The court held that the statute giving consent for the
United States to be sued did not apply where the plaintiff
was making a claim for community property, not child support or alimony.
174. The legislative history of Q 662(c), the definitional
amendment, indicates that it was enacted merely to alleviate
confusion in the lower courts. Simply, the federal government's immunity to garnishment suits involving community
property awards was affirmed. See supra note 104, and 439
U.S. a t 599-600 n.4 (Stewart, J., dissenting). Congress decided to waive the federal governmerit's sovereign immunity
to legal process for alimony and child support claims after
concluding that to do so would alleviate potential and actual
welfare payments to neglected spouses and children. 439
U.S. at 587 11.20. See supra text aocompanying note 105.
Although alimony is not always tied to need, many recipients of welfare and AFDC could be removed from the public
assistance rolls if there were a mechanism through which
existing support obligations could be enforced. 439 U.S. at
587. Community property settlements may satisfy the same
goal, but need is not usually a factor when a community
property settlement is made. 439 U.S. at 587. When Congress excluded community property from the definition of
alimony, it may have been limiting the cases in which the
federal government would be amenable to legal process to
those which were most urgent.
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employee spouse.175The restrictive definition of
alimony, limiting it to its common law meaning
of spousal support exclusive of community property settlements, was probably used only to protect the government from burdensome garnishment suits for community property.17e
Throughout its discussion of garnishment for
alimony awards, the Court proceeded on the assumption that only those in dire need are awarded
a1im0ny.I~~
In fact, need is only one of the reasons
why al-imony may be awarded.178The Court assumed that needy persons in community property
states would be awarded alimony and would be
able to garnish benefits to satisfy the alimony
award.179This assumption ignores the reality that
alimony is not awarded where there is an inability
to pay.lBOIt also ignores one state's laws. Texas
does not allow permanent alimony; lB1 the only
way for a non-employee spouse in Texas to have
any income is to demonstrate his or her community interest in a pension acquired during the
marriage.

The Hisquie~doCourt pieced together a makeshift interpretation of the Railroad Retirement
Act requiring pre-emption of California community property law. Summarizing the inadequacies
in the majority's reasoning, the dissent wrote:
From the Court's own review of the Railroad Retirement Act, it is apparent . . .
that the asserted federal conflict with
California community property lawsfar from being grounded upon the concrete expressions that ordinarily are required to support a finding of federal
pre-emption . . . is patched together
from statutory provisions that have no

175. See supra note 104.
176. See 439 U.S. at 599-600 n.4 (Stewart, J . , dissenting).
177. 439 U.S. at 587.
178. Factors taken into account by courts when awarding
alimony include: the payor spouse's ability to pay; the recipient spouse's needs; the fault of the parties; the parties' ages
and health; the duration of the marriage; the couple's standard of living; what one party gave up when he or she married the other; the property of the parties, and the parties'
respective contributions to its accumulation; the parties'
THELAWOF DOother financial responsibilities. H. CLARK,
MESTIC RELATIONS
I N THE UNITED
STATES441-47 (1968).
179. 439 U.S. at 590.
180. See supra note 178.
181. TEX.FAM.CODEANN. Q 3.59 (Vernon Supp. 1981).
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relationship at all to substantive property
rights. Indeed, the federal 'policies' the
Court perceives amount to little more
than the commonplace that retirement
benefits are designed to provide an income on retirement to the employee.
There is simply nothing in the Act to
suggest that Congress meant to insulate
these pension benefits from the rules of
ownership that in California are a normal incident of marriage. '"
Confronted with this lack of clear conflict or comprehensive scheme, the Court should have
adopted a statutory interpretation which left the
state law intact.
The Court in Hisquierdo articulated the test
traditionally used in pre-emption cases stating
that state family law has had to yield when "Congress has 'positively required by direct enactment'
that state law be pre-empted,"lB3 and that preemption is mandated when "the right as asserted
conflicts with the express terms of federal law and
. . . its consequences sufficiently injure the objectives of the federal program to require nonrecognition."lg4Yet the Court did not apply this test for
pre-emption to the federal program at issue. The
Railroad Retirement Act's terms requiring disposition of benefits upon divorce are neither express
nor direct.lB5Moreover, the division of pension
benefits under California community property
law would not have disrupted the federal statutory s ~ h e m e . " ~
Despite this weakness, the Court relied on Hisquierdo in two significant 1981 decisions: McCarty u . McCartyls7 and Ridgway u. R i d g ~ a y . ' ~ '
In McCarty, the Court held that federal law precluded California courts from dividing military
retirement pay pursuant to state community
property law. The Court reasoned that California's application of community property concepts
to military retirement pay conflicted with federal
law in two respects: first, retirement pay differs
from a pension because, unlike a pension, it is not
deferred compensation for services performed

182. 439 U.S. at 591 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
183. Id. at 581, quoting Wetrnore v. Markoe, 196 U.S.
68, 77 (1904).
184. 439 U.S. at 583.
185. See supra text accompanying notes 137-40.
186. See supra text accompanying notes 151-53.
187. 453 U.S. 210 (1981).
188. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
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during the marriage, but rather is current compensation for continuing, although reduced, services; and second, retirement pay is a personal entitlement payable to the retired serviceperson for
life. lag
In a common law case from Maine, Ridgway v .
Ridgway,lgOthe Court held that the Servicemen's
Group Life Insurance Act (SGLIA), which gives
members of the armed forces the right to designate and change the beneficiaries of their government life insurance policies, pre-empted a state
court decree in a divorce proceeding that awarded
the proceeds of the policy to the former spouse
and children of the serviceperson. The Court said
that Wissner controlled, protecting the serviceperson's right to designate his or her beneficiary.lg1
The statute included an anti-attachment provision to which the Court applied its interpretation
of the anti-attachment provision in Hisquierdo.
"What was said of the statute under consideration
in Hisquierdo . . . is applicable without qualification here. . . . We find nothing to indicate that
Congress intended to exempt claims based on
property settlement agreements from the strong
language of the anti-attachment provision."lg2
It is unclear what direction the Court will take
in future cases involving possible pre-emption of
state family-property law because the Burger
Court's willingness to pre-empt in decisions involving distribution of assets upon divorce contrasts sharply with its usual deference to state interests. As the Ninth Circuit recently noted:
"With respect to preemption the Supreme Court's
emphasis varies from time to time. At times the
preemption doctrine has been applied with nationalistic fervor while during other periods with
generous tolerance of state involvement in areas
already to some extent the subject of national conern.'''^^ It is possible that the Supreme Court will
require any program of pension benefits enacted
at the federal level to pre-empt state community
property law. Application of loose pre-emption
standards could lead to wholesale pre-emption of
state community property laws by federal legislation, thereby stripping community property of

189. 453 U.S. at 221-32.
190. 454 U.S. 46 (1981).
191. Id. at 55-56.
192. Id. at 61.
193. Morseburg v. Balyon, 621 F.2d 972, 976 (9th Cir.
1980), cert. den., 449 U.S. 983 (1980).
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any practical significance. Ont: commentator calls
the Hisquierdo decision:
[A] stab in the back [for American community property law]. . . . It cuts at the
very heart of community property: the
principle of equal ownership of gains by
either spouse during marriage. Unless the
system is subjected to a major overhaul,
there is no more equality for the marriage subject to this alleged intermeddling by Congress. . . . [Clongress
would have no reason at all to throw
such kind of monkey wrench into the
marital property machint:ry of the eight
community property states. Prior to Hisquierdo, the state courts had almost always found no such hostility on the part
of Congress when it enacted statutes calling for the payment of federal funds to
married persons. . . . [Slince numerous
federal statutes . . . take account of the
existence of community property in some
states and make special provision to accommodate [it], there was every reason
to believe that Congress had an intent
not to disturb community property
law. lg4
Whatever the long-term effects of Hisquierdo
on American community property law may be,

194. Reppy, Learning to Live with Hisquierdo, 6 COMPROP.J . 5, 5, 7-8 (1979).
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the short-term implications are clear. The language in ~ i s ~ u i e rcharacterizing
di
the retirement
benefits as the exclusive entitlement of the employee spouse prohibits including their value
among the assets to be divided upon dissolution of
the marriage. The language is conclusive in community property states since it characterizes the
benefits as the employee spouse's separate property. lg5
By recognizing the Railroad Retirement Act
benefits as community property, better results
would have been reached. Such a decision would
have properly recognized and affirmed the value
of contributions made by both partners to the
marriage, particularly where one partner's contributions were primarily non-financial. In addition, because both partners would receive either a
guaranteed income or lump-sum settlement of the
Act's benefits, a number of post-divorce financial
disputes would probably be eliminated, thereby
providing some relief to our overburdened court
system.
195. It may also be conclusive in equitable distribution
states, although in some of those states, separate property
may be considered in making an equitable division of marital property. For a discussion of equitable distribution, see
Comment, Equitable Distribtrtion of Property in New Jersey, 28 RUTCERS
L . REV.447 (1974). For a list of states which
have enacted equitable distribution, see [Reference File]
FAM.L. REP. (BNA) 11400:iii-400:v. However, if Congress'
intent that the benefits be paid solely to the employee spouse
is to be effectuated, benefits should theoretically be unreachable in equitable property divisions.
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